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The Court, the Constitution, and Chief
Justice Burger
William F. Swindler*
INTRODUCTION

Although the constitutional crisis of 1973 has not yet demanded
a definitive response from the Supreme Court, it obviously has established a landmark in the ultimate history of Warren Burger's
Chief Justiceship. While the unprecedented confrontation between
executive and judiciary was not carried beyond the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, Burger's old court,' and although the
prospective confrontation between executive and Congress did
not-at least in its first round 2-reach a stage of review on the
merits, the questions presented went to the cornerstones of AngloAmerican constitutional theory itself 3 The case of Vice President
Agnew raised issues of executive privilege that in their own right
invited exhaustive judicial analysis of the nature of the vicepresidential office, but an historic nolo contendere plea in a dictrict
court scotched that opportunity.' Moreover, the stirrings in Congress of proposed impeachment proceedings would, if they compel
5
Senate action, necessarily involve the Chief Justice of the Court.
In this apocalyptic succession of events, it has been necessary
to qualify Charles Evans Hughes's famous aphorism that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is," 6 by observing that the Constitution which the Court interprets must be viewed in the perspective
of the age. With issues of such magnitude as those arising from
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1935; B.S. 1935, Washington
University of St. Louis; M.A. 1936; Ph.D. 1942, University of Missouri; LL.B. 1958, University of Nebraska.
1. Nixon v. Sirica, 42 U.S.L.W. 2212 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 19, 1973).
2. Application of Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. 1282 (1973).

3. See generally E.

CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS

(5th ed. 1957); R.

(1960); C. RoSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1956).
4. Application of Spiro T. Agnew, In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Civil Docket No. 73965 (D. Md., Oct. 10, 1973).
5. It was at least symptomatic of the national uneasiness that 2 studies on the subject
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER

should become best sellers of sorts. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS (1973); HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, 93rd Cong.,
IstSess., 1973.
6. "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and
the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and our property under the Constitution." Charles
Evans Hughes, address at Elmira, N.Y., May 3, 1907.
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Watergate, it is manifest that they will affect directly or indirectly
the constitutional jurisprudence of the current decade and beyond.
This situation is fortuitously part of the essential background of the
Burger Court itself; and yet, even if Watergate had never intruded
upon national and world affairs, the emerging features of the Burger
Court would still have warranted scrutiny and evaluation. For by
now, in the course of its fifth term, the Court under this Chief
Justice has assumed some distinctive characteristics which lend
themselves to analysis.
I.

THE FORMATION AND OPERATION OF THE BURGER COURT

"Court watching" is a somewhat self-conscious activity of
American political, legal, and journalistic sophisticates. The close
in 1969 of the Earl Warren years of broad judicial activism was
accompanied by more than the usual flurry of comment and antici7
pation as Warren Earl Burger assumed the Chief Justiceship.
While Court watching has certain built-in hazards of exaggeration
and self-delusion, the Warren Court had indeed made some of the
most epochal advances in constitutional jurisprudence since the era
of John Marshall.' Inevitably, the Burger Court would be evaluated,
at least at the outset, in terms of the extent to which it followed,
qualified, or departed from the Court's categorical pronouncements
of the preceding decade.
Apart from the often controversial activism of the Warren era
itself, certain political events conspired to bring the High Court
before the public eye. In his 1968 campaign for the Presidency,
Richard M. Nixon spoke often of his intention to do something
about the trend of constitutional decision making in the 1960's. In
his second campaign, he occasionally-albeit rather vaguely
-referred to what had been "accomplished" on the matter.,
Even more significant, however, was the fact that from the spring
of 1969 through the winter of 1972, the Court was affected to a
greater degree than at any time in the present century by the politics of nomination and confirmation. Following a clumsy effort by
outgoing President Lyndon B. Johnson to maneuver Justice Abe
Fortas into the Chief Justice's chair and the blitzkrieg unleased by
7. E.g., Kurland, Enter the Burger Court: The ConstitutionalBusiness of the Supreme
Court, Oct. Term, 1969 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1971); Black, Unfinished Business of the Warren
Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970).
8. See Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutional Revolution, 23
VAND. L. REV. 205 (1970).
9. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, Oct. 12, 1968; Oct. 10, 1972.
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incoming Attorney General John Mitchell, which eventually drove
Fortas from the bench,"0 President Nixon became the first White
House occupant since Grover Cleveland to suffer two successive
congressional rejections of his nominees to the Court." Moreover,
the devious manner by which the path was prepared for the later
nominations of successors to Justices Hugo Black and John M. Harlan also contributed to the malaise in which the Burger Court was
obliged to undertake its work.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that within his first term of office President Nixon had the unique opportunity to place four men
of his choice on the bench 2 and to shift the Court ineluctably away
from the activist orientation of the Warren-Fortas-Black group toward the Frankfurter-Jackson-Harlan pole of judicial restraint.
After the Senate debacle involving Judges Clement Haynsworth
and G. Harrold Carswell, the appointments of Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis F. Powell 3 to the seats of Justices Fortas and Black
established a new ideological balance, while the addition of Justice
William Rehnquist for Justice Harlan further consolidated the shift.
This series of appointments, however, did not lead to an automatic departure from the judicial landmarks of the previous decade.
Indeed, many conservatives were jolted in the fall of 1969 by the
Court's first major opinion, which affirmed the principle of nondiscrimination in public schooling." The Pentagon papers decision of
the following term, 5 while not as unequivocal as many liberals
would have wished, evidenced little sympathy for the government's
arguments; and the death penalty opinion 17 soon thereafter presented a rationale that the Warren Court had implied but never
affirmatively developed." Even in the cases of juries of less than
twelve members 9 and nonunanimous verdicts, 2 which purported to
declare that sixth amendment standards in these areas were not
10.

See R.

A
(1972).

SHAGAN,

THE SUPREME COURT

QUESTION OF JUDGMENT: THE FORTAS CASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

11. See Swindler, The Politics of "Advice and Consent", 56 A.B.A.J. 553 (1970).
12. Cf. Swindler, The Supreme Court, the President and Congress, 19 INT. & COMP.
L.Q. 671 (1970).
13. For a discussion of Justice Powell's placement on the Court see Howard, Mr. Justice
Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1971).
14. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
15. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
16. Id. at 718-20.
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
19. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
20. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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controlling on the states, the result was to ignite a spontaneous
movement within the federal judiciary towards applying the sixth
2
amendment principles to their own procedure anyway. '
Nevertheless, the Burger Court has not escaped some caustic
criticism in the course of its still-short tenure, 22 and the Chief Justice's activism in the area of court reform and judicial modernization has disturbed at least one leading scholar.2 3 The more pessimistic of the liberals see the Court retreating along a calculated course
from the positions that its predecessor established in matters of
federally enforced integration, defendants' rights, and electoral
equality. The complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment, all but accomplished during the last years
of the Warren Court, is also being mourned, perhaps prematurely,
as dying on the vine. 24 Less pessimistically, however, as this study
will argue, the Burger Court appears to have chosen to consolidate
and to confirm certain basic concepts within these constitutional
areas rather than to push ahead in ever-broadening generalities.
William Howard Taft believed that the ultimate test of the
effectiveness of a Chief Justice's leadership was his ability to "marshal the Court"-a process that was less a matter of inducing the
unanimity of colleagues than of guiding the institution itself on a
path of consistency. Taft himself succeeded in meeting this test, at
least in the early part of his term, by citing to the controlling authority of the long years of laissez-faire constitutionalism dating back
to Melville Fuller's Chief Justiceship and beyond.2 The majority of
his colleagues, including Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sanford,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter, shared a similar philosophy and
consistently contained the minority composed of Justices Brandeis,
Holmes, and Stone. In addition to Taft's ability to set the Court on
a consistent path, his leadership of the entire judicial system was
demonstrated by his pioneer work in developing the Judicial Conference of the United States and his lobbying for the Judiciary Act of
1925.26 By this act the Supreme Court gained greater freedom
21. See Devitt, The Six-Man Jury and the Federal Courts, 53 F.R.D. 273 (1972); Fisher,
The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507
(1973); The Six-ManJury: A DiscussionBefore the JudicialConference of the Fourth Circuit,
59 F.R.D. 180 (1973).
22. E.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
23. Kurland, The Lord Chancellorof the United States, 7 TRIAL 11 (1971).
24. See Daykin, The Constitutional Doctrine of IncorporationReexamined, 5 U. SAN
FRAN. L. REV. 61 (1970).
25. See W. SWINDLER, THE OLD LEGALITY, 1888-1932, chs. 13, 14, (1969).

26.

28 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1970).
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through discretionary (certiorari) powers of review, and the intermeof final disposition in a
diate appellate courts became the courts
27
proportionately larger number of cases.
Against these dual strengths of Taft's Chief Justiceship, the
leadership and administrative effectiveness of his successors may be
assessed. The records of Chief Justices Stone and Vinson are for
various reasons, negligible under these tests. 28 The records of
Hughes and Warren, however, fare somewhat better and, together
with Taft's accomplishments, may be taken as the standard of comparison by which to measure the record of the Burger Court to date.
On the basis of leadership and administrative prowess, Hughes
scores high among Chief Justices. Administering a bench of drastically changing personalities and adjusting to the ideologies that
evolved from the uncompromising last stand of the judicial conservatives in the early New Deal, through the critical Court fight in the
winter of 1937, to the beginning of a new constitutional posture in
the fall term of that year, his task of Court leadership was far more
demanding than Taft's.29 As for judicial organization and administration, Hughes completed Taft's threefold program of reform when
Congress vested authority in the judiciary to draft and promulgate
uniform rules of procedure.3 1 Moreover,, he added a significant contribution in his own name with the establishment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.3 ' In later years, Justice
Warren, finding the Court in shoal waters of congressional confrontation in the wake of the McCarthy era, led the bench from that
crisis, for better or wrose, to the far-ranging activism of the 1960's.
Equally important to Warren's record of accomplishments, however, was his development of the Judicial Conference of the United
States into a fully effective instrument for the systematic study of
32
the whole field of court management and judicial procedure.
One of Chief Justice Burger's major techniques to "marshal the
Court" has been to suggest in his opinions legislative alternatives
that might change the result reached in a particular case. Through
this practice, the Chief Justice attempts to accommodate the daily
operations of state and national units without offending the princi27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252 et seq. (1970).
28. See Swindler, The Chief Justice and Law Reform, 1921-1971, 1971 Sup. CT. REv.
241, 252-53 (1971).
29. See W. SWINDLER, THE NEW LEGALrry, 1932-1968, ch. 4, (1970).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, 3288, 3289
(1970).
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
32. Swindler, supra note 28, at 254.
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ples of the Court. For instance, in his dissent in Bivens v. Six
Agents, 33 the Chief Justice suggested that Congress might effectively
set limits to the exclusionary rule consistent with fourth amendment guidelines theretofore established by the courts much as it had
defined the boundaries of the immunity rule within the fifth amendment. Burger commented that the constitutional purpose, rather
than the automatic application of a judicial rule, was the measure
of a defendant's rights, and that "the single monolithic and drastic
judicial response to all official violations of legal norms" too often
frustrated legitimate criminal procedure.3 4 His alternative was a
Congressional enactment:
Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against
the government itself to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose
Fourth Amendments rights have been violated. The venerable doctrine of
respondeat superiorin our tort law provides an entirely appropriate conceptual
basis for this remedy . ... Such a statutory scheme would have the added
advantage of providing some remedy to the completely innocent persons who
are sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct-something that the suppression doctrine, of course, can never accomplish.,

In seeking to offset the side effects of automatic and unqualified
application of fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process standards to the states-to delimit the incorporation doctrine-the Chief Justice again pointed to the opportunity and, indeed, the responsibility of the legislative branch. Writing for the
majority in Williams v. Illinois,36 which set aside a state court sentence imposing additional workhouse time for defendants unable to
pay fines, Burger declared that there were "numerous alternatives"
that could accommodate constitutional guarantees, and suggested
some of them in a footnote.3 1 Similarly, in Furman v. Georgia,38
which invalidated most state death penalties, the Chief Justice's
dissent urged that legislatures be given an opportunity to bring their
laws into compliance with new eighth amendment standards set out
in the majority holding. He contended that the legislature, as much
as the judiciary, was qualified to translate changing moral values
into law.
Such judicial hints to lawmakers may be criticized as disguised
advisory opinions or as potentially prejudicial to future adjudica33. 403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 418.
35. Id. at 424.
36. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
37. Id. at 236 n.3; see also the appendix to the case, taken substantially from amicus
brief of National Legal Aid and Public Defender Ass'n., id. at 246.
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1971).
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tions of legislative responses that might be made. 39 There also still
remains the Court's responsibility of continually identifying the
constitutional standards to which legislation must conform. But the
larger objective of the Burger Court, and the one which would appear to be gaining both legislative and judicial attention, is to bring
legislative and judicial functions into closer harmony by sharing the
burden of implementing constitutional objectives. Viewed in such
a light, the efforts of the present Chief Justice seem to conform to
Taft's ideal of fashioning a consistent and characteristic doctrine,
the first indicator of a Chief Justice's leadership. But Burger's
image is only now beginning to develop with some clarity. In order
to make even short term evaluations of the Chief Justice's success
or failure, it is necessary to study his activities as a leader of both
the Court and the entire judicial system.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE BURGER COURT

The Warren Court left as its legacy a series of broad constitutional propositions with which there could be little quarrel. The
recurrent review of cases even during the Warren Court tenure,
however, belied the appearance that firm practical rules of decision
had been developed. 0 Consequently, the practical difficulty of
applying these general ideals to routine issues was left largely to the
Burger Court. The ringing pronouncements of racial equality, one
man-one vote, and indigent's right to counsel had to be reconciled
with the realities of custom, economic necessity, and the simple fact
that public interest in such matters had its limitations.
Seen in these terms, the recent function of the Burger Court has
been less a discarding of the Warren Court principles than a case of
attaching metes and bounds to them. This distinction in itself reveals a difference between the respective Courts' view of their functions. While for the Warren Court, in the heyday of judicial activism, the rectification of social injustice became the moral standard
and the sine qua non of constitutional decision making, the Burger
Court attempted a more dispassionate balancing of individual,
group, and governmental interests. The Court of Brennan, Black,
Douglas, Fortas, Marshall, and Warren increasingly came to regard
"injustice" as the issue to be adjudicated, and accordingly the outcome of a particular case was seldom in doubt. The Court of Black:39. See Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT.
REv. 1 (1973).
40. See Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1969); Mason, Judicial
Activism, Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385 (1969).
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mun, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, and White, however,
adheres more readily to precedent than to predilection and places
its primary emphasis upon the practical consequences and rational
basis of a decision.
The record under both Chief Justices must be examined in the
context of their respective decades-the 1960's punctuated by -domestic activism which gave impetus to and received encouragement
from the innovative reform attempts of the New Frontier and the
Great Society; the 1970's colored indelibly by the American extrication from the bitter Viet Nam experience and overlaid by the specter of corrupt government emanating from the Watergate affair. The
setting for the Court in the 1960's may be seen as a climax of the
perennial American belief that nothing ever has ultimately proven
impossible to attain. For the Court of the present decade, however,
there is currently a wave of self-doubt about the indefinite continuance of the American success story. In the Warren years, the first
principle of constitutional jurisprudence was the belief in the ability
to accord absolute effect to rights guaranteed under the Constitution. On the other hand, the reality today, it may be suggested, is
the imperfect attainment, and even imperfect understanding, of
these rights.
The present analysis is not intended to be an exhaustive survey
of Burger Court business, but rather as an analysis of some of the
major constitutional propositions uniquely identified with the Warren years and the treatment of those propositions in opinions of the
Burger Court since the fall of 1969. Four major areas of
constitutional action developed in the 1960's: desegregation and racial justice; the protection of equal opportunities in the electoral
process; the rights of the individual in the criminal process; and the
definition of fundamental freedoms under the first amendment.
Accordingly, these are the areas on which this section of the article
will focus.
A.

Desegregationand Racial Justice

The image of the Warren Court in civil rights was fixed in 1954
with its epochal holding in Brown v. Board of Education.4 The
principle of desegregation enunciated therein will remain as the
identifying feature of the Warren tenure as surely as Watergate,
irrespective of any ultimate Supreme Court involvement, will be41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown is associated with the Warren Court even though the
case was first argued during the tenure of Chief Justice Vinson.
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come a dramatic constitutional feature of the Burger years. The
wide spectrum of racial litigation, which opened with Brown, was
still generating issues at the close of the final Warren term and has
continued to do so in each term of the Burger Court. If, as suggested
above, the policy of the Burger Court is to define the parameters of
such issues as they come before the Court, some of these limits in
the civil rights area may have become discernible in the aftermath
of two school cases in the spring of 1973.
Richmond School Board v. State Board of Education42 and
Keyes v. School District3 presented the question of how far the
federal judiciary and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment could be expected ultimately to pursue the matter of
educational integration. In the Richmond case, the Fourth Circuit
had determined that the federal issue ended with conclusive evidence that state-imposed segregation had been eliminated; beyond
that, there was no federal right to an absolute racial balance.4 4 A
four-four division of the Supreme Court"5 sustained the Fourth Circuit opinion that, in turn, had reversed a district court ruling that
had drawn explosive reactions.4 6
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Keyes continued to rely
upon this de jure-de facto distinction in evaluating whether there
had been a constitutional violation. Originally the Court spelled out
the distinction as a possible means of setting metes and bounds for
the general issues of integration. In deciding Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education" in 1971, Burger found that the
"constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that
every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole,"48 but only that school
authorities had to meet the burden of proof that racial imbalances
were not the consequences of a planned policy. In accordnace with
this reasoning, the Court in a companion case struck down an antibusing statute as perpetuating de jure or government-enforced segregation. 9 The following year, however, the Chief Justice dissented
in a case in which the majority had found that the separation of city
42.
43,
44.
45,
pate.
46.
47.
48.
49.

412 U.S. 92 (1973).
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
Justice Powell, a onetime member of the Richmond school board, did not particiBradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 24.
North Carolina State Bd. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
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from county schools, previously joined in a single school system, was
prima facie evidence of dejure segregation." Such a division, Burger
said, might result in de facto segregation, but whether it was de jure
ought to rest clearly on something other than a value judgment of
the majority. 51
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in the Keyes case, however,
suggested that the limit had been reached in the reliance upon the
increasingly complicated distinctions between de jure and de facto
segregation.52 His statement sounded what may become the death
knell for the distinction itself. Powell concluded that the majority
was actually seeking a means of recognizing that the "affirmative
duty doctrine," presumably established in Brown, had been
changed by Swann into a doctrine of required integration for school
systems to effectuate equality in the quality of education itself.
This, in Powell's view, made the de jure-de facto distinction irrelevant since judicial responsibility lay in the review and confirmation
of the bona fides of local efforts-of many variations-to achieve the
53
goal of quality education in terms of an integrated school system.
Both the reasoning used in the school cases and the search for
limits on constitutional phrases, were applied in the widely discussed "liquor license" case of 1972, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.54
There the Court sought to identify limits to the state action doctrine
once so sweepingly applied by the Warren Court. Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for a six-three majority, reversed a three-judge district
court decision that a private club's racial discrimination could be
attacked on fourteenth amendment grounds by finding state action
in the continued validation of its liquor license. The majority declared that state action does not extend to every sort of state service
or regulation, but that "the state must have 'significantly involved
itself with invidious discrimination,' " to be held an essential party
to the complaint. 5
The upshot of the Burger Court activities in the race relations
area is that the Court will interfere in private or administrative
activities with less predictability than in the previous decade. The
unequivocal declaration of the Warren Court had been that separation of functions and facilities was discriminatory and violated the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
Id. at 471 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 219-23.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Id. at 173, citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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equal protection clause when it involved essentially public areas
such as public education,"5 public accommodations offered by private parties,5 7 private enterprises licensed for public convenience by
public authority,"8 and private interests which ultimately looked to
state action for their protection. 9 The Burger Court, however, has
sought to sharpen the boundary lines for these propositions by distinguishing between de facto and de jure discrimination or separation." It has also distinguished "affirmative duties" to provide nondiscriminatory or integrated facilities from the option of not providing such facilities at all,"' and further differentiated a consistent
state policy to support a public service from the necessity of a local
government policy augmenting the state policy."2
B.

Repportionment and Electoral Equality

In addition to the racial equality cases, Court watchers have
been alert for any apparent departure from the "one man-one vote"
doctrine so broadly asserted in Reynolds v. Sims."3 In its closing
months, the Warren Court seemed prepared to extend indefinitely
the search for mathematical equality at every level of the electoral
process; by the spring of 1973, however, the Burger Court appeared
instead to be searching for a standard of "fair and effective" representation-again, a policy of seeking metes and bounds."
In the spring of 1969, the Warren Court had apparently settled
upon a specific mathematical standard of population variation
among representative districts-no more than six percent-and intended to apply this to all levels of the electoral process. 5 It had also
specifically rejected congressional districting that sought to "keep
regions with distinct interests intact" if such districts could not be
brought into a population ratio essentially the same as in other
districts." In February 1970 the Burger Court continued the trend
in this direction in a six-three majority holding that this standard
56. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
58. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
59. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
60. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
61. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
62. San Antonio Indpt. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
64. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
- 65. Kirkpatrick v. Preissler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
66. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
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could apply to elections for trustees of public junior colleges. 7 The
following term, however, the Court, speaking through Justice
Marshall, declared that a strict mathematical equality of votes was
not to be expected in elections for county governments." This move
was followed by a refusal in Whitcomb v. Chavis" to become involved in qualitative or subjective arguments, such as the question
whether multi-member legislative districts over-represented these
districts either by block voting in the legislature or by failing to
express the divergent viewpoint of minorities within their districts
whose own candidates had failed to get elected.
Proof, rather than presumption, of intended discrimination or
malapportionment became increasingly emphasized in several 1972
cases.70 Thus, in Sixty-seventh Minnesota Assembly v. Beens, 7' the
Court denied the right of a lower federal court to reduce the number
of legislative districts and the number of members of each house of
a state legislature when the reapportionment plan of the state had
not been shown to be discriminatory. The per curiam opinion stated
that "[wle know of no federal constitutional principle or requirement that authorizes a federal reapportioning court to go as far as
the District Court did and, thus, to bypass the State's formal judgment as to the proper size of legislative bodies." 72 The Court found
that none of its decision had gone that far and made it clear that it
3
felt it was unlikely that such a situation would ever arise .
A "fair and effective representation" standard was affirmatively stated in several 1973 cases, in which the Court declared that
although gross population variations might constitute prima facie
evidence of calculated malapportioment, mathematical equality
itself was but one of several factors that state districting plans
should take into account. 74 In White v. Regester,75 however, it reaffirmed the principle that districting plans with the effect of disfran67. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
68. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
69. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
70. See Independent Voters v. Lewis, 406 U.S. 913 (1972); Sixty-seventh Minn. Assembly v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
71. 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
72. Id. at 198.
73. At the same time, however, as though to emphasize its continuing commitment to
the general principle of reasonable equality of voting districts, the court did approve a reapportionment plan from another state because, as the decision pointed out, the population
deviation among districts was less than 2%. Independent Voters v. Lewis, 406 U.S. 913 (1972);
Grivetti v. Election Bd., 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
74. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
75. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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chising certain minority groups clearly violated the equal protection
clause. While this holding may justify a federal court's dissolution
of single-member districts in favor of a multi-member district when
the single-member plan had the effect of segregating a particular
group of voters, a lower court was forbidden to intervene, without
proof of intended discrimination, when there was merely a difference in the apportionment plans for the two houses of a state legisla7
ture. 1
In other dimensions of the electoral process, the Burger Court
has also sought to establish the parameters of Warren Court pronouncements. In the mid-1960's, during Warren's tenure, federal
equal protection standards had been extended to state laws concerning voting qualifications. In Carrington v. Rash,77 the majority
warned that a Texas constitutional provision denying members of
the armed forces their right to vote while stationed within the jurisdiction would violate fourteenth amendment standards and would
constitute invidious discrimination if it were shown that an individual accordingly was barred from seeking to overcome "the presumption of non-residency." 7 8 In 1972, the doctrine of Carrington was
applied to a Tennessee durational residence requirement that, the
Court found, curtailed an electoral right and a right to travel without demonstrating an offsetting compelling state interest. 79 On the
other hand, in 1973 cases from Arizona" and Georgia 8' the Court
observed that neither the judiciary nor the state legislatures would
be justified in setting arbitrary time periods to qualify for an electoral privilege.
The Warren Court had also questioned the validity of discrimination between electoral qualifications in special or local elections
as distinguished from general elections. In 1969, Chief Justice Warren placed the burden of proof upon the state to show a compelling
state interest that justified any discrepancy between electoral requirements; and the proof had to go not only to the validity of the
interest, but also to the necessity of accomplishing the state purpose
by means of the discrimination.82 If the electoral restriction was
irrelevant to the state's objective, the restriction was suspect before
76.
77.

Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
380 U.S. 89 (1965).

78. Id.
79.
decision,
80.
81.
82.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). It may be noted that this was a 6-1
previous to Justices Powell and Rehnquist joining the Court.
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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the Court.13 By 1973, the Burger Court had stated the converse of
the Warren Court rule: when the special purpose of the election is
reasonably related to the electoral interest affected, the presumption should be in favor of the validity of the electoral restriction. "
In 1971, a unanimous Court distinguished and departed from
the widely discussed Warren Court holding in Williams v. Rhodes,85
which had invalidated a state law subjecting minority parties to
different requirements as to the number of signatures on their nominating petitions and the time stipulated for filing the petitions. In
8 a divided majority of the Burger Court held
Jenness v. Fortson,"
that minority candidates, including, in this instance, candidates
who failed to survive the primary voting, may be required to show
''a significant modicum of support" before winning a place on the
general election ballot.8 7 The standards for electoral participation
laid down by the Warren Court in 1966 in Harper v. Board of
Elections,8 however, were unanimously reaffirmed by the Burger
Court in 1972. Since "restrictions on candidates affect voters as
well," a filing fee requirement which falls "more heavily on the less
affluent segment of the community" invites strict judicial scrutiny.89 The ultimate test, as both the Warren and Burger Courts
have concluded, is whether electoral restrictions "are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest." 9
The Burger Court's apportionment standards have thus become fairly distinguishable from those of the Warren Court. The
"absolute equality" objective continues to be applied in the case of
congressional redistricting, but is not necessarily required in all
cases of state legislative redistricting: In the former situation, the
standard is equality of representation for all citizens of the United
States; in the latter, however, there may be valid consideration for
the normal function of state and local governments in relation to
each other, and the alternative standard of "substantial equality"
has emerged.9 As Justice White observed, it was one thing to attack
83. Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
84. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973);
see Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
85. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
86. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). See also Lippitt v. Cipallone, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
87. 403 U.S. at 442.
88. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
89. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
90. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 763-71 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. at 315 (1973).
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enormous discrepancies in representation formulae at any level of
government, but quite another thing to "become bogged down in a
vast, intractable apportionment slough, particularly when there is

little, if anything, to be accomplished by doing

S0.''92

Despite these

variations from the Warren Court position, the Burger Court has
continued to accept the responsibility of searching for "suspect"
procedures and practices which may, in areas other than apportionof the guarantee of equal enjoyment of
ment, contribute to a denial
3
the electoral franchise.
C.

Defendants' Rights and Law and Order

In the third of the Warren Court constitutional doctrinesequality of individuals in the criminal process-the Burger Court's
behavior has also come under elaborate scrutiny. It was in the area
of so-called"law and order," in fact, that the Warren Court's
critics had been most vociferous; the ultimate assertions of
defendants' fifth and sixth amendment rights stated in Miranda v.
Arizona94 and Gideon v. Wainwright95 were expected to be the first
points attacked by the Nixon appointees. 6
The Burger Court's acceptance of the general practice of plea
bargaining due to what Justice White called its "mutuality of advantage" to both prosecution and defense9 alarmed some of the
Court watchers. Its widespread use in some stages of the Watergate
prosecutions has been criticized and the Agnew denouement is another object lesson for those who decry the practice. Aside from
these developments of great public and political interest, considerable emphasis has also been given to Kastigar v. United States,"
upholding the constitutionality of the federal immunity statute.
The majority in that case found that immunity under the statute
put the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court reasoned that since
92. Id. at 329.
93. See id. at 315; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973).
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
96. The result may have been an exaggerated importance laid upon Chief Justice
Burger's subsequent statements in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), in which he
declared that "the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged" should not frustrate a legitimate effort to test a defendant's credibility. Id. at 225.
97. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
98. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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Murphy v. Waterfront Commission99 had barred the use in any federal court of testimony, as well as evidence derived from testimony,
when immunity had been granted in another court, even a state
tribunal, the Kastigarrefinement of Murphy accordingly should be
extended to the states.0" It is against the background of the Kastigar
reasoning that Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents""
may be better appreciated. In his dissent, Burger addressed the
problem of treating various rules of procedure as synonymous with
constitutional guarantees. Thus he believed that the exclusionary
rule applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Mapp v. Ohio,"2 was unrealistically being treated as a "monolithic
and drastic judicial response to all official violations."'0 3 Instead,
the current majority suggests plea bargaining as an accommodation
of the practical need to get to the facts in a criminal prosecution.
The Court has assumed the position that society should not be
denied effective means of carrying out its business because of the
exclusionary rule, a rule that really should penalize the agents of
investigation rather than society as a whole.
Until such time as Congress should enact appropriate legislation defining proper and improper actions by government officers,
however, the Court has firmly adhered to the enforcement of the
basic provisions of the fourth amendment and reaffirmed their extension to the states through the fourteenth.' While the sixth
amendment right to counsel as presented in Gideon has been criticized as tending toward inflexibility, it too has consistently been
upheld."' With reference to rights of indigents both to counsel and
to transcripts for appeal, the rule in Griffin v. Illinois,' as progressively extended in Douglas v. California,"°7 has indeed been extended to nonfelony cases by the Burger Court.0 8 For the purposes
of evaluating the Burger Court activities in light of the earlier Warren Court decisions, the field of defendants' rights can be broken
down into its three main constitutional subheadings.
99. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
100. See Zicarelli v. Investigation Comm'n., 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Sarno v. Crime
Comm'n., 406 U.S. 482 (1972).
101. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
102. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
103. 403 U.S. at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
104. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 410 U.S. 218 (1973).
105. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
106. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
107. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
108. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
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1. Fourth Amendment Safeguards.-Search and seizure restrictions had been a distinctive doctrine of the Warren Court, from
Mapp v. Ohio"9 in 1961 to Chimel v. California"° in 1969. Electronic
surveillance had been so sternly scrutinized under these and related
decisions"' that Congress had felt compelled to redefine its own
understanding of the constitutional issue in 1968.111 In the process
of this shifting of standards, the Court had also emerged with a new
statement of "prospective overruling" with particular reference to
fourth amendment cases." 3 The Burger Court was expected ultimately to re-evaluate all of these concepts, and to the degree that
it has done so to date, it may be said that the Court has sought to
clarify rather than to enlarge the rules stated by its predecessor.
Thus the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents"4 affirmed
the proposition that violation of a defendant's rights gives rise to a
cause of action for damages. Burger's dissent in the case was directed not at that proposition but rather at the impropriety of making the damages action a justification for unqualified application of
the Mapp exclusionary rule."' While the Watergate scandal has
made courts suspicious of the government's readiness to "bug" in
the name of national security,"' the reasonable use of electronic
surveillance under statutory procedures has been upheld,"7 and the9
"stop and frisk" standard in Terry v. Ohio"' has been enlarged.1
Searches of apprehended vehicles that were conducted under reasonable circumstances such as routine custody and resulted in the
unexpected discovery of evidence were approved by a five-four majority in the 1972 term 2 and by a six-three vote early in the 1973
term.''
2. Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination and Fifth Amendment Rights.-One of the last major constitutional decisions of the
109. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
111. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
112. See Title III of Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1970). For a
Burger Court refinement see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
113. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); see Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505
(1973).
114. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
115. Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
117. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
118. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
119. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
120. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
121. Gustafson v. Florida, U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
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Warren Court overruled a twenty-two year old opinion 22' and extended the double jeopardy prohibition to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.'2 3 The Court further expanded the reach of
the sixth amendment in the same term by declaring that a double
jeopardy defense might properly be asserted when a substantially
harsher penalty is imposed on retrial or at a new trial.' 21 In 1972, the
Burger Court restricted the literal reading of the second of these
rulings by holding that a second trial resulting in a more severe
penalty did not ipso facto raise a double jeopardy question.' 25 Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the basic rule against double jeopardy
as applied to the states and gave it retroactive effect in Ashe v.
2
Swenson.' 1
Miranda and the use of confessions, however, were the paramount issues upon which the Court watchers focused their attention. When Harris v. New York 127 sanctioned the use of illegally
obtained evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony, there was
much professional outcry.proclaiming a retreat from the earlier
Warren Court principle forbidding its use.' 28 Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion in Harrisobserved that the privilege against selfincrimination "cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury" upon a defendant's voluntarily taking the stand.'29 In contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent submitted that an accused should
not forfeit his right to prevent the use of prior illegally obtained
testimony offered in evidence to impeach his credibility.'30 Since
Harris, the Court has not addressed itself further to the basic
Miranda principle, although a prior case had pointed the Court in
the direction followed by Harris.'3' In the 1971 term, the Court in
two divided opinions upheld convictions resulting from the admission in evidence of defendants' confessions. The first held that a
judicial determination of admissibility obviated the need to submit
the admissibility question to the jury, 32 while the second treated the
122.
123.
124.
125.
(1973).
126.
127.
128.
YALE L.J.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
See Notes in 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241 (1971); 85 HARV. L. REv. 44 (1971); 80
1198 (1971).
401 U.S. at 225.
Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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use of the confession in a record as harmless error because of an
otherwise "overwhelming" case against the accused.13 Moreover,
the Court has stated that a guilty plea entered as a means of avoiding a potentially harsher penalty following a jury trial 34 is not
coerced within the meaning of the basic Miranda principle.
The issue, of compelled testimony, which has been raised in the
more recent self-incrimination cases, elicited a criterion of sorts
from the Burger Court in its November 1973 decision in Leftkowitz
v. Turley.'11 Justice White, speaking for a nondissenting though
nonunanimous Court, concluded that, while no state interest is so
compelling as to require forfeiture of fifth amendment rights, the
state's interest in requiring testimony may be effectuated by "sup1 3
planting" the constitutional right with an immunity guarantee. 1
Thus Kastigar, which in 1972 introduced the general principle of
validity in reference to a federal immunity statute, 37 is now conso38
nant with the scope of state immunity guarantees.
3. Sixth Amendment Rights.-The fifth amendment Miranda
principle complemented and capped a series of sixth amendment
right-to-counsel cases that began with Gideon v. Wainwright,39 and
continued through Escobedo v. Illinois,"' United States v. Wade, 4'
and Gilbert v. California.12 These decisions made the assistance of
counsel a fundamental right in such preliminary stages of a felony
prosecution as police interrogation and identification. Extending
the sixth amendment right still further to nonfelony cases, the
Burger Court in the 1972 case of Argersinger v. Hamlin'3 declared
that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial.""' On the other hand, the present Court in a five-four decision
declined to apply the right to counsel guarantee to identification
133. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); see Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224
(1972).
134. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971).
135. U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 316 (1973).
136. Id. at -,
94 S. Ct. at 326.
1:37. See note 98 supra.
138. See note 135 supra.
139. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
140. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
141. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
142. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
143. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
144. Id. at 37.
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procedures antedating an indictment.1 5
Among the other notable sixth amendment decisions of the
Burger Court are the jury trial rulings in Williams v. Florida,4 6
Apodaca v. Oregon, 7 and Johnson v. Louisiana,' which taken together suggest that such historically sacrosanct institutions as the
twelve-person jury and unanimous verdict are not essential constitutional rights. While these decisions initially may have been
viewed as signalling a halt to further incorporation of the sixth
amendment into the fourteenth, the practical effect, strikingly
enough, has been the tendency of federal courts to apply the incorporation doctrine to their own jurisdictions-a kind of reverse incorporation malgr6 lui.11
A defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, another
sixth amendment principle made applicable to the states by the
Warren Court, '10 was circumscribed by Schneble v. Florida.5 ' Under
the earlier Warren Court rule, a conviction based upon the testimony of a codefendant who declines to take the stand at trial contravenes the accused's confrontation right. 5 2 In Schneble, where the
codefendant's testimony only indirectly added to the evidence supporting conviction, the Court again invoked the harmless error
principle. While critics of the "latitudinarianism" of the Warren
Court expressed gratification at this decision, 5 ' the Burger Court's
general confirmation of sixth amendment guarantees'" belies the
claims that Warren Court principles in this area of the Bill of Rights
are being neutralized.
The present Court's approach to the methodology of its predecessor is further illustrated in its 1972 opinion in Furman v.
Georgia.55 In that case, which virtually outlawed the death penalty
under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment, the Court effectively revitalized the incorporation doctrine. The persuasiveness of the majority opinion in the case is
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
Court, 86
154.
155.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
See note 21 supra.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
405 U.S. 427 (1972).
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
See Supreme Court, 1971 Term: In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing
HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
See Moore v. Arizona,__ U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 188 (1973).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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weakened by the fact only five of the Justices concluded that capital
punishment was unconstitutional under specific circumstances.
Moreover, each of the nine Justices wrote his own version of the pros
and cons. Apart from the result reached the most significant consensus of opinion was that cruel and unusual punishment, admittedly
not contemplated by the eighteenth century framers of the eighth
amendment to apply to the death penalty, was susceptible of redefinition in the light of changing social convictions. This construction,
if not broad in the Warren Court sense, nevertheless reflects the
essence of modern constitutional construction. The majority opinion
further intimated that convicted persons are entitled to conditions
of imprisonment that do not impinge upon other constitutional
rights, such as the freedom of worship, 5 ' and which do not chill, by
threats of retaliation, the exercise of rights, such as the prisoner's
right to appeal his conviction.'5 7
This discussion of the Burger Court's treatment of defendant's
rights, then, indicates that while the activist Warren Court critiqued the constitutionality of each step in the criminal justice system solely by the standard of equal protection, the Burger Court,
seeking to define practical boundaries for this principle, has instead
inquired whether particular acts of state agents jeopardize specific
rights of the defendant. In the area of fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, for instance, the
Court's current quest is to arrive at the most viable tests for reasonableness."' Recognizing that the state's interest in finding the truth
must be afforded some alternatives,'5 9 the present Court is not so
quick to conclude that anything casting doubt upon the defendant's
version of the facts is a possible infringement of his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. This same pragmatic approach is
reflected in the sixth amendment questions concerning the size of
juries and the unanimity of verdicts where, as Justice White stated,
"the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen" does not depend upon a
fixed number of jurors for its effectiveness. 6 ' Essentially the same
156. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
157. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). See also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95
(1972) (repeated threats to criminal defendant's only witness of the consequences of perjury
denied him the opportunity to present witnesses in his own defense).
158. See W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE NEW
LEGALITY 1932-1968, ch. 15 (1970).
159. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
160. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
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reasoning also applied to the nonunanimous verdict.'6 ' Whether this
reasoning-a willingness to substitute contemporary practical standards for historic common-law definitions-may be attributed to
the Burger Court on the basis of the rationale in these two cases and
the death sentence case 6 2 needs more thorough analysis. Nevertheless, it is an attitude that one would have found more characteristic
of the Warren Court. If the attitude persists in the Burger Court, it
may prove a significant clue to intellectual continuity rather than
contrast.
D. First Amendment Freedoms
A series of major cases in the field of individual freedoms has
enabled the Burger Court to articulate its views of the rights accumulating under the several subheadings of the first amendment. In
the 1971 Pentagon Papers Case,'6 3 a landmark of sorts, the Court's
per curiam opinion offered minimal insight into the social and legal
factors that moved the Court to its decision. The most significant
comments offered, to the extent that they existed at all, appeared
in the six concurring and three dissenting opinions of the individual
justices. Although Justices Black and Douglas merely seized upon
the opportunity to restate their concept of first amendment absolutes,'64 Justice Brennan found that the government had simply
failed to carry the burden of proof explicitly demanded by the constitutional language.6 5 More significantly, Justices Stewart and
White rejected the claims of executive privilege for all executive
documents absent proof of their bearing upon national security'l6 -a
strikingly prescient opinion-while Justice Marshall, in a similarly
reasoned opinion, pointed to the explicit decision of Congress not to
vest in the executive the criminal power that he requested.' 7 Following his practice of seeking a means of conciliation, Chief Justice
Burger's dissent argued that the media and the government should
have sought to agree upon the sort of information that is susceptible
68
of classification.'
In a subsequent case,'69 Justice Blackmun asserted that when
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1971).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Id. at 714, 720.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 730-40.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 750-51.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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executive discretion is based upon a "facially legitimate and bona
fide reason,"'' 7 first amendment rights are narrower in scope. The
courts, he added, would "neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion nor test it by balancing its justification against the First
Amendment interests.' 7' Blackmun added, however, that
"attacking [the] exercise of discretion for which no justification
whatever is advanced" was a different question not then before the
Court' 72-a comment which takes on new significance in light of the
claims of executive privilege advanced during the Watergate affair.
The somewhat ambivalent support afforded first amendment principles against government national security claims in the Pentagon
Papers case was stated more positively in another 1971 case,
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 73 There, the broad privilege to
comment on public figures enunciated by the Warren Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan7 1 was extended by the Burger Court to
75
include private participants in an event of public interest.
The reopening of the whole matter of obscenity and the first
amendment in the spring of 1973 has been one of the most controversial moves made by the Burger Court to date. The Court clearly
and unmistakably indicated a commitment to withdraw from the
total permissiveness of the Warren years. This action invited a reexamination of virtually all of the major decisions by the Warren
Court in this area, from Roth v. United States 71 in 1957 to the
sequence of cases between 1966 and 1968.177 During this period, the
first amendment protection had progressively covered "ideas having
even the slightest redeeming social importance," "appeals to prurient interest," standards of taste based upon a kind of nationwide
composite, and finally reached a rule that the right of privacy protects obscene matter on private premises.
Recapitulating in 1971 what it perceived as the original Roth
principle, the Burger Court stated that that case "squarely placed
obscenity and its distribution outside the reach of the First
170.

Id. at 770.

171.

Id.

172.
17:3.
174.
175.

Id.
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
403 U.S. at 44. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human

Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
176. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
177. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (Fanny Hill Case); Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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-, Pursuing a line of reasoning implicit in its

restatement of Roth, the Court in 1973 emphasized that the doctrine
of privacy formulated in Stanley v. Georgia'79 was not applicable to
a commercial public theater,18 and in a companion case declared
that a local community standard was the only feasible means of
determining what in fact was obscene.'"' Authoring the majority
opinion in Miller v. California,82 the Chief Justice clearly indicated
that the Court was abandoning the "Fanny Hill" standard which
"called on the prosecution to prove a negative-that the material
was 'utterly without redeeming social value.' "83 He then added

that while
fundamental First Amendment limitations on the power of the states do not
vary from community to community, this does not mean that there are or
should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what appeals
to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive."'"

In the religion clause cases arising under the first amendment,
the Burger Court continued the general establishment and free exercise doctrines of the Warren Court. Although tax exemptions for
properties used solely for religious purposes were upheld in 1970,183
the Court in 1971 invalidated a Rhode Island statute providing for
salary supplements to the faculties of church-related schools because the program required too much state participation.'86 In
construing the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,'11 the Court
found no violation of the establishment clause in federal aid to
church-related colleges having broad interdenominational student
bodies pursuing secular studies.'88 In 1973, however, New York and
Pennsylvania plans to reimburse parents for tuition paid to sectarian schools were held unconstitutional on establishment clause
grounds.' 9 In the area of free exercise of religion, the most significant case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,'"" upheld the right of high school age
178. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
179. 394 U.S.-557 (1969).
180. Paris Adult Theatre No. 1 v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
181. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
182. Id.
183. Id.at 22.
184. Id.at 30.
185. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
186. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
187. 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-21 (1970).
188. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
189. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); see
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
190. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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children of a particular sect to be exempt from compulsory school
attendance that would conflict directly with their religious tenets.
The rights of assembly and association and the freedom of conscience as qualified by loyalty oath requirements, once burning issues of the early Warren years, left some lingering embers in the
period from 1969 to 1973. In Connell v. Higginbotham,'9 ' the Court
distinguished a loyalty oath that merely affirmed support of state
and national constitutions from one that improperly required a
statement of political belief upon which summary dismissal could
be based. A slightly different wording of the oath, which required
affirmance of opposition to violent overthrow of government, was
upheld the following year as being essentially a specific definition
of the loyalty affirmation in the basic oath.'9 2 The bar admission
cases of the early Warren years were also restated early in the Burger
Court tenure. While it continued to require the state to demonstrate
an overriding public interest supporting political affiliation disclo' the Court in Law
sures by candidates for admission to the bar, 93
94
Students Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond' rejected the argument that such questiofis on bar examination applications had a
chilling effect on the free exercise of first amendment rights.
Other than a Burger Court tendency toward stricter definition
of limits appearing in the freedom of assembly cases,' the greatest
degree of continuity discernible in a comparison of the Warren and
Burger Courts lies in the freedom of religion cases.' A definite
dichotomy has developed in the freedom of expression cases,'97 however, with the Pentagon Papers case' 8 suggesting a somewhat fortuitious confirmation of first amendment guarantees, and the 1973
obscenity cases' 9 more clearly signalling a withdrawal to an early
post-Roth position. It may be useful to note that the incorporation
of the religious freedoms into the fourteenth amendment, as supported by the present Court, may be traced as far back as the late
1930's and early 1940's,21" and the incorporation of the basic principle of freedom of the press as far back as the mid-1920's.2 °' The
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freedom of assembly and association cases, which are now being
circumscribed by the Burger Court, and the new construction of
obscenity relate to constitutional propositions identified directly
with the Warren years.
E.

Watergate Envoi

It would be a manifest distortion of the Burger Court history
to confine even this limited study to a comparison and contrast with
the Warren Court. New vistas of constitutional decision making
have confronted the Court since October 1969: environmental issues
have reached a stage of final review;1 2 the 1973 abortion decisions0 '
have precipitated a furor reminiscent of anti-Warren diatribes on
other subjects; and some basic opinions in the area of sex discrimination have been handed down. 2 4 As suggested at the outset, however, the congeries of constitutional issues for which "Watergate"
became a catch phrase have sounded the dominant note for the
present Court.
There currently appear to be at least two unrelated cases that
may contribute guidelines to a prospective judicial review of
Watergate-related issues. In the first of these cases, United States
0 5 a nondissenting Supreme Court
v. United States District Court,"
rejected a government claim that national security justified warrantless "bugging" of domestic dissidents. Declaring that Title III
of the 1968 Crime Control Act 2 6 neither added to nor detracted from
the constitutional quantum of executive power in this area, the
Court, speaking through Justice Powell, noted that "Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them" and that those
powers did not impinge upon first or fourth amendment rights. '
Powell observed that "the danger to political dissent is acute where
the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the
power to protect 'domestic security,' ",208 and added that "[i]f the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether
there is probable cause for surveillance." ' 9
202. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972).
203. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
204. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
205. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
206. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
207. 407 U.S. at 303.
208. Id. at 314, 320.
209. Id. at 310, 321.
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In the second case, Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 2'11 the Court found without merit a claim that executive prerogative sufficed to invoke the statutory exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act of 1966.211 Commenting in the course of its
opinion that no executive officer should be the sole judge of the
scope of his own privilege, the Court adopted a rule stated even
more affirmatively in another case, significantly enough, by the
212
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
The basic constitutional question raised in the 1973 phase of
Watergate concerned the nature and scope of executive privilege
itself. Owing primarily to the absence of more definitive authority,
United States v. Burr213 was cited repeatedly as the leading case on
the liability of the executive to judicial process.2 The District of
Columbia courts did not take refuge in Chief Justice Taney's escape
doctrine of "political questions, 2' 25 but addressed themselves to the
issues of the obligation of the executive to produce evidence and the
power of the judiciary to compel such production.
Doubtless, the silence of the courts on the doctrine of executive
privilege or prerogative can be explained in part by the absence of
any reference to that subject in the Constitution itself. As noted
elsewhere, 26 the common-law distinctions between the two concepts
have tended to be blurred in American usage. The term privilege,
as used in the relevant clause of the Constitution, 27 means simply
an exemption from legal process under limited conditions. Prerogative, which has been defined only in English constitutional law, is
an inherent power of the sovereign-with which, in this instance,
the executive branch may be equated-to act free of legislative or
judicial restraint.2 8 In any event, the definition that the courts ultimately may give to either concept will likely reflect the American
historical and political experience.
In the area of foreign relations, the courts have unequivocally
recognized the freedom of the executive to act with minimal checks
or balances on its discretion.21 9 In the domestic area, however, the
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

410 U.S. 73 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14, 694) (1807) (C.C.D. Va.).
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
See W. SWINDLER, THE MODERN INTERPRETATION 134 (1974).

217. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 6.
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now renowned Watergate tapes subpoenas found the question virtually one of first impression. The district court concluded that it
was within the judicial power to compel the executive branch to
produce evidence relevant to the proceedings of an investigatory
grand jury. 2 " In sustaining this holding, the court of appeals declared that "a limited requirement" that the evidence be produced
"is required by law, and by the rule that even the Chief Executive
is subject to the mandate of the law where he has no valid claim to
'22
privilege. '
In a related case, however, the district court found that it had
no jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena issued by the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. 222 Congress thereupon enacted a bill which vested such jurisdiction in the district
court and which became law without Presidential signature. 22 By
the end of 1973, the executive branch had complied with the appellate court's ruling in the case of the grand jury subpoena and had
elected not to perfect an appeal to the Supreme Court. Moreover,
the Select Committee, which did not appeal the district court dismissal of its subpoena petition, issued new subpoenas for a great
number of executive documents on the strength of the new jurisdic224
tional statute.
The unresolved issues of Watergate-with their emphasis upon
impeachment and the question of impeachable offenses 215-have
reached no definitive stage at the time of this writing. As suggested
early in this study, however, the one indisputable fact is that the
constitutional problems generated by Watergate will become an historical landmark of the Supreme Court record of the 1970's.

III.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND MODERN JUDICIAL PROCESS

One of the more conspicuous dimensions of the Burger Chief
Justiceship has been his active involvement in judicial reform at
both federal and state levels. 221 Shortly after taking office in 1969,
he assumed leadership of a movement to organize and finance a new
service agency, the Institute for Court Management, which initiated
a program of selecting and training classes of managerial specialists
220. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
221. Nixon v. Sirica, 42 U.S.L.W. 2212 (Sept. 19, 1973).
222. Application of Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. 1282 (1973).
223. Act of Dec. 3, 1973, 87 Stat. 736 (93rd Cong., 1st Sess.).
224. 32 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. 3204 (1973).
225. See note 5 supra.
226. See Swindler, supra note 28, at 256.
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to handle much of the time-consuming paper work in the federal
court system 2 7 In 1970, the Chief Justice accepted the invitation of
the American Bar Association to deliver an annual "State of the
Judiciary" address, and at the A.B.A. convention that year enumerated specific recommendations, including the establishment of
state-federal judicial councils,2 2 which have since been organized in
a majority of states. At the National Conference on the Judiciary
held at Williamsburg, Virginia, in March 1971, he delivered the
keynote address to an unprecedented convocation of judges, attorneys general, state crime commission agencies, and bar association
representatives from every state. 2 9 Following his second.A.B.A.
address and participation in a transatlantic conference of British
and American bar leaders in London, ° he returned to Williamsburg
in December 1971 to address the first National Conference on
Corrections."'
The much-debated Freund Committee report 32 on ways and
means of alleviating the burgeoning work load of the Supreme Court
was the product of a study inspired by the Chief Justice. Chief
Justice Burger can also witness with gratification the congressional
establishment in 1972 of offices of court administration for each of
the federal judicial circuits.2 33 Because of the sensitivity of state
legal interests, Burger remained in the background during the creation of the National Center for State Courts, a service agency comparable to the Federal Judicial Center in the national court system.
Nonetheless, the widespread knowledge of the Chief Justice's interest in the proposed National Center exerted substantial influence
over those considering the plan. 4
The Chief Justice's extraordinary degree of initiative is attributable to his frequently expressed conviction that the judicial machinery of the United States, federal and state, has been increasingly
jeopardized by a critical work load. That he has not been alone in
this view was evidenced in 1968 by an eloquent call for radical
reform made by John P. Frank in lectures at the dedication of the
Earl Warren Legal Center at the University of California.25 More227. See Burger, Court Administrators-Where Will We Find Them?, 55 J. Am.
Soc'y. 108 (1969).
228. See Burger, State of the Judiciary,56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
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over, two University of Chicago authors the following year issued a
provocatively-titled commentary on the need for modernization of
criminal justice.23 The problem of providing post-conviction remedies without congesting the federal court system, which was reviewed for the Federal Judicial Center in 1970,23 and the exhaustive
report on drug traffic and addiction2 3 8 sponsored in i971 by the
American Bar Foundation, are more recent examples of studies undertaken with a view to reform.
The Chief Justice seized upon both law and professional concern for decisive action to urge a general program of reform. He
informed the National Association of Attorneys General that if the
states were to regain jurisdiction over their own criminal justice
systems, they must cure the procedural defects in their systems of
post-conviction review and search more assiduously for better postconviction treatment than incarceration without rehabilitation.21
He called for an examination of alternatives to judicial disposition
of cases involving routine automobile injury claims, such as professionally supervised adjustment procedures without recourse to
courts. 20 In addition to reform proposals, Burger has urged the
bench and bar to take greater advantage of existing technological
advances in the areas of electronic data retrieval, closed-circuit television, and computerized and uniform records on the status of dock24
eted cases. '
While these activities have not delighted all observers, 242 it is
obvious that if both state and federal courts are in the critical situation which so many observers discern, a concerted program of leadership that can come only from the Chief Justice of the United
States is needed.2 43 The reform and modernization of state judicial
processes, as Burger has repeatedly emphasized, is the most effective means of providing relief for the federal judicial process 2. 44 The
235. J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969).
236. N. MORRIS & C. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITIcAN'S GUIDE TO

CRIME CONTROL

(1970).
237. See State Post-ConvictionRemedies and FederalHabeas Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 149 (1970).
238. See R. NIMMER, 2,000,000 UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1972).
239. Burger, State Criminal Cases in Federal Courts: Some Proposalsfor Self-Help and
Mutual Aid. Remarks to the National Ass'n of Attorneys General, Washington, D.C., Feb. 6,
1970.
240. See note 224 supra.
241. Id. at 929.
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243. See Swindler, Fifty-One Chief Justices, 60 Ky. L.J. 851 (1972).
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first step, he points out, is to utilize devices already proven effective
in operation, such as a unified court system achieved by the federal
judiciary in 1922;215 a professional administrative service to relieve
judges of nonjudicial work;" 6 and a system for discipline or removal
of ineffective jurists where an impeachment proceeding is too harsh
or cumbersome."'
Thus the present Chief Justice has pushed ahead from the pioneering efforts of Taft and Hughes," 8 has continued the work of
Warren in converting the Judicial Conference of the United States
into a policy-reviewing agency," 9 and has broken much new ground
in an effort to expedite the efforts to modernize both the state and
federal judiciary in the 1970's. The test, of course, will be the degree
to which these goals are are attained in the remainder of the decade;
but in initiating the effort itself, Chief Justice Burger has already
written a new chapter in judicial administration that may have
great importance for the whole American system of justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to discuss and evaluate the effect Warren Burger's leadership as Chief Justice has had thus far upon the
course taken by the Supreme Court in constitutional jurisprudence
and upon the judicial institution generally. In the major constitutional areas pushed vigorously forward by the activist Court of the
1960's, the Burger Court has demonstrated in its first four terms a
disposition either to advance more deliberately or to march in place.
The most conspicuous instance of retrenchment from the later Warren Court doctrines has been in the matter of obscenity. In race
relations, equitable representation, and defendants' rights, the
emphasis of the Burger Court, for the most part, has been upon
establishing more definite guidelines to the generalities of the Warren Court precedents. The Warren Court had attempted a philosophical balance between the Black-Douglas doctrine of absolutes
and the Harlan-Stewart doctrine of absolutes enjoyed within established limits defined by the federal structure and the separation of
judicial and legislative functions. It seems clear beyond cavil that
the Burger Court generally has pursued the Harlan-Stewart con245. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291,321 (1970).
246. See note 31 supra.
247. See, e.g., DAYNES, THE COMMISSION PLAN FOR THE
JUDGES (Publication of American Judicature Society, 1968).
248. See notes 25-31 supra.
249. See note 32 supra.
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cept. This philosophy has appeared repeatedly in decisions concerning state enforcement of civil rights, 5 the slightly flexible applicastandard, 25' and the validation of crimtion of the one man-one vote
2
.statutes
inal immunity
As the ranking judicial officer of the country, the Chief Justice
has been both an outspoken critic of the deficiencies in'the present
system of justice and an advocate for improvements within the existing structure. Subjecting Burger's performance in both roles to a
short-term evaluation, it appears that the present Chief Justice
compares well with Taft, Hughes, and Warren, his Twentieth Century predecessors. History's ultimate opinion of Warren Burger,
however, will depend to a great extent upon his ability to guide the
Court through the treacherous political waters of the era while
maintaining the integrity and independence so essential to the
judiciary.
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